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The Lisbon Treaty:
A Qualified Advance for
EU Decision-Making
and Governance
By Dr Edward Best Dr Edward Best Dr Edward Best Dr Edward Best Dr Edward Best*1
The Lisbon Treaty represents a significant shift in EU decision-making, although important
changes have already taken place as the institutions have adapted to enlargement. The
extension of majority voting promises some further increase in efficiency, and the extension of
codecision as the “ordinary legislative procedure” strengthens the formal democratic aspects
of the process. The new system of instruments and procedures, including the new distinction
between delegated acts and implementing acts within non-legislative acts, may also prove
easier for people to understand, despite the existence of multiple exceptions and special cases.
However, it remains to be seen how several important aspects of the new system will be
implemented in practice; it is not clear that this will in itself increase legitimacy; and the dynamics
of change will continue to be felt. Even if there is no major treaty reform in the near future, this
is not the end of history when it comes to the EU institutional system.
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
This contribution discusses the impact of the Lisbon Treaty
on EU decision-making procedures from two perspectives.
First, it discusses whether the resulting system of binding EU
acts is likely to be simpler and more efficient in terms of
producing decisions.
Second, it asks how far
the Treaty promises to
strengthen the foundations
of the Union by addressing
the basic challenges for
decision-making in terms of
(good) European govern-
ance? That is, does it seem
likely also to increase the
transparency of procedures
and the quality of the results,
as well as the overall legiti-
macy of the system?
It therefore starts by summarising the main issues which
have been at stake, then reviews the changes introduced by
the new Treaty, and finally offers some tentative assessments
of the likely impact of Lisbon on the EU’s decision-making
processes.
Simplification and problem-solving Simplification and problem-solving Simplification and problem-solving Simplification and problem-solving Simplification and problem-solving
Member States have largely agreed on two basic drivers for
reform of the Union’s constitutional structure and decision-
making procedures. On the one hand, there has been
universal support for simplification of the complicated
system which has grown up bit by bit over the last decades.
On the other hand, and with less consensus as to the
solutions, there has been pressure for substantive problem-
solving. That is, there has been broad political agreement,
with considerable public support, that in certain spheres the
existing arrangements of the Union are dysfunctional for
the achievement of shared
objectives, and are so to an
extent that outweighs the
sovereignty costs of joint
action. Consequently a
formal change in powers
and procedures has been
accepted which strengthens
European decision-making
at the expense of national
discretion. In both respects,
it has also been hoped that
reforms would boost legiti-
macy, both on the “input” side, by permitting a clearer
understanding among citizens as to how decisions are
taken (and perhaps also a feeling of greater influence on
decision-making), and on the “output” side, by producing
tangible benefits in areas of popular concern.
The process of simplification was to begin with the basic
treaty structure. The Treaty of Maastricht, the “Treaty on
European Union” (TEU), modified the content of the three
Community Treaties, which continued to exist within the
TEU.3 In its Titles V and VI, it also established the bases for
intergovernmental cooperation between the Member States
There has been universal
support for simplification of
the complicated system
which has grown up bit by
bit over the last decades.
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in the form of a Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP
– the “second pillar”) and Cooperation in Justice and Home
Affairs (the “third pillar” – since 1999, Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters).
The EU since Maastricht has thus often been presented
in the form of a Greek “temple”, with the Union as the roof,
the Communities as the naos
at the heart, and inter-
governmentalism as the
surrounding peristasis. This
model rather accurately
reflects the way in which
European integration has
historically worked. Stability
in the complex and contested
process has been assured by
a combination of a range of
commitments based on law,
and the acceptance of more
flexible arrangements around
that indispensable “hard core”. Yet these arrangements
have resulted in a degree of complexity which is
incomprehensible to most people, as well as working
against efficiency and effectiveness even in policy areas in
which where there is a general consensus. Only the
Communities have explicit legal personality. Each pillar
gives the institutions different powers and uses different
instruments and procedures.
The Constitutional Treaty proposed to merge the Treaty
of Maastricht and the Treaty of Rome (the Community
Treaty, that is: given the sensitivities over nuclear energy,
Euratom was never going to be merged, but simply attached
to the Union – hopefully out of public sight). The Lisbon
Treaty does not go so far. Indeed, the result of the retreat
from the Constitutional near-unification is that we will go
from a situation in which we have three Treaties to one in
which we will have … the same three Treaties, one with a
different name. The TEU remains as such, continues to
include CFSP, and gives legal personality to the Union. The
Community Treaty becomes the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU) and notably includes the
former third pillar. The two treaties are said to have “the
same legal value”, and the Union replaces and succeeds
the Community (the term
“Community” is system-
atically replaced through-
out). Euratom remains a
separate Treaty, modified
by a Protocol annexed to
the Treaty of Lisbon.
The resulting structure
can no longer be captured
by the old architectural
imagery (although it is
tempting to say that, given
the continued specificities of
procedures in both CFSP
and, albeit within the TFEU, of police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters, the change has been from a Greek
temple, with pillars on the outside, to a Roman villa, with
pillars on the inside). It is more complicated than it could
have been, which is a disappointment in terms of making
the constitutional structure of the Union more
comprehensible to people. Nonetheless, as far as the
practical consequences for decision-making are concerned,
this does represent an advance in terms of both simplification
and problem-solving because the same instruments and
largely the same procedures will be applied in police
cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
The simplification exercise was equally directed at the
Union’s multiple legal instruments and decision-making
procedures. The Community started with three binding
legal instruments (Regulation, Directive, Decision) and one
main procedure: decision by the Council on the basis of a
We will go from a situation
in which we have three
Treaties to one in which we
will have … the same three
Treaties, one with a
different name.
Celebrating 50 years of the Treaty of Rome.
© The Council of the European Union, 2008
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Commission proposal, generally after consulting the
Parliament. In theory, qualified-majority voting (QMV)
would come to apply in numerous sectors in contrast to
unanimity, thus creating two main alternatives within this
“consultation” procedure,4 but in practice this was not used
until the 1980s. Over the decades, decision-making
procedures proliferated. The role of the EP in decision-
making was strengthened,
however, by successively
adding on new procedures
in specified areas. By the
early 1990s the EP variously
had the right of consultation,
cooperation and codecision
in legislative procedures, as
well as its budgetary powers
and the right of assent. At
the same time, a second level
of Community law was
consolidated as the system
of Community implementing
acts was formalised: that is,
the delegation of powers in
secondary legislation by the
Council (or later, the Parliament and Council) to the
Commission for the application or adaptation of certain
non-essential elements of the rules. Numerous different
procedures were defined governing the way in which the
Commission should consult these “comitology” committees.
As already noted, the new “pillars” had their own
instruments and procedures. Together with the lack of a
clear hierarchical differentiation between binding
Community instruments, the result was complex and hard
to understand. There were regulations, directives and
decisions adopted on the basis of the Treaty (by different
forms of inter-institutional interaction); regulations, directives
and decisions adopted on the basis of secondary legis-
lation (with different forms of consultation with commit-
tees); common strategies, joint actions, common positions
and decisions in CFSP; and framework decisions, decisions
and common positions in the third pillar. One of the core
mandates given to the European Convention by the Laeken
European Council was thus to reduce the number of
instruments and procedures.
Instruments Instruments Instruments Instruments Instruments
The Constitutional Treaty had proposed two legislative
acts: “European laws” and “European framework laws”,
which would respectively replace, with the same legal
characteristics, the regulations and directives currently
adopted by the Community legislator on the basis of the
treaty. Everything else would be squeezed into two non-
legislative categories of regulations and decisions
The introduction of the word “law”, however, was
among those symbolic elements which were dropped in
order to demonstrate that the new treaty did not have a
constitutional character. The Lisbon Treaty therefore retains
regulations, directives and decisions as the legally-binding
instruments of the Union for legislative acts and for all kinds
of non-legislative acts.5 The loss of the terminological
distinction between these two kinds of act may well be
regretted on the grounds of transparency, although the
system proposed in the Constitutional Treaty would have
introduced other forms of complexity as well being a
practical nightmare to introduce (Best 2003).
Only one instrument, the decision, is changed. It will
henceforth be defined as follows: “A decision shall be
binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to
whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them.”6 This
covers both decisions as defined in Article 249 of the TEC,
which are individual instruments addressed to specified
parties (ranging from all the
Member States to an indi-
vidual company); and “sui
generis” decisions adopted
in the framework of the
Community which have no
addressees (for example, in
trade policy, for the adoption
of action programmes or to
change organic rules).
Whereas the instruments of
the third pillar will genuinely
disappear, the changes in
CFSP are largely cosmetic. A
“common strategy” becomes
a “European Council deci-
sion on the strategic interests
and objectives of the Union”; a “joint action” a “decision
defining a Union action”; and a “common position” a
“decision defining a Union position”.
Legislative acts Legislative acts Legislative acts Legislative acts Legislative acts
Like the Constitutional Treaty the Lisbon Treaty explicitly
establishes a category of “legislative” acts, divided according
to the procedure by which they are adopted.
Codecision, by which the Parliament has equal rights
with the Council, becomes the “ordinary legislative
procedure” and is extended to over 40 new cases. The new
areas notably include agriculture and most of the former
third pillar. In this latter respect, however, the extension has
come at a price. The Commission will share the right of
initiative with one-quarter of the Member States.7 An
“emergency brake” is foreseen in different ways for decisions
on criminal procedure, the definition of offences and
sanctions, the establishment of a European Public
Prosecutor’s Office, and operational cooperation between
police, customs and other specialised law enforcement
services. In these cases the procedure may be suspended
for four months and referred to the European Council,
possibly resulting in the proposed measure going ahead in
the form of enhanced cooperation among at least nine
Member States.
A category of “special legislative procedures” covers
several other forms of interaction between Council and
Parliament. These include the annual budget negotiations,
in which the Parliament has gained in power notably by
virtue of the abolition of the distinction between “compulsory”
and “non-compulsory” expenditure, and the formal
introduction of the Conciliation Committee procedure. The
Parliament adopts “regulations on its own initiative”
concerning exercise of the right of inquiry and conditions
governing the performance of MEPs and the Ombudsman’s
duties. There are five cases of “consent” by the European
Parliament (a renaming of the present “assent”), concerning
procedures for European elections, combating discrimin-
ation, citizens’ rights, implementing measures for the system
of own resources and the multi-annual financial framework.
Codecision, by which the
Parliament has equal
rights with the Council,
becomes the “ordinary
legislative procedure” and
is extended to over 40
new cases.www.eipa.eu
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Finally, there are 22 cases in which Parliament is only
consulted – of which, in 20 cases, the Council acts
unanimously. These apply in a number of cases in justice
and home affairs, as well as in the usual sensitive areas for
Member States such as taxation or social security.
Non-legislative acts Non-legislative acts Non-legislative acts Non-legislative acts Non-legislative acts
The Lisbon Treaty introduces two categories of non-legislative
acts which will have to start replacing the present system of
“comitology” – just as the ongoing reform of that system
reaches its full implementation. In order to assess the
impact, one needs to look briefly back at the previous
stages in this process. There have been four basic issues.
The first, the pursuit of a clearer hierarchy of norms –
meaning a terminological distinction between those binding
acts adopted on the basis of primary law and those binding
acts adopted on the basis of the secondary acts – has
already been mentioned.
The second issue has concerned rationalisation and
standardisation of the procedures governing the
Commission’s consultation of committees. By the mid-
1980s, a proliferation of different procedures had grown
up. The first “comitology decision” in 1987 provided for a
menu of seven different procedures. The second comitology
decision of June 1999 reduced this to three procedures8 –
advisory, management and regulatory – which provided
standard options between which the legislator could choose.
This was accompanied by standard rules of procedure and
improvements in transparency.
The third issue has been the basic question as to whether
the Commission should be subject to control in the exercise
of its delegated powers of execution. The Commission has
always stressed the importance of expert advice, but would
have liked to remove the control involved in management
and regulatory committees. The Commission’s 2001 White
Paper on Governance thus proposed “a simple legal
mechanism [which] allows Council and European Parliament
as the legislature to monitor and control the actions of the
Commission against the principles and political guidelines
adopted in the legislation” (EC 2001 p.31). In the
Convention, some Member States did support this position.
The majority, however, insisted on retaining a reference to
“control by the Member States”.
The fourth concerns the European Parliament’s rights
with regard to supervision of implementing measures when
it comes to base acts adopted by codecision, since comitology
committees only include representatives of the Member
States. This has been the source of inter-institutional debate
since the early 1990s. The 1999 decision only partly
satisfied the Parliament, by giving it the rights of information
and of scrutiny, meaning the right to receive the drafts of
proposed measures implementing elements of acts adopted
under codecision, and to adopt non-binding resolutions,
within one month, indicating that the Commission had
exceeded its powers.
The Constitutional Treaty proposed a major reform.
Amid the uncertainty following the French and Dutch
referendums, however, a 2002 Commission proposal to
modify the comitology decision was revived, leading to a
major reform in 2006. A new procedure known as
“regulatory with scrutiny” was introduced. This applies to
measures of general scope for which powers are delegated
to the Commission in secondary legislation adopted by
codecision, and which modify non-essential elements of
the base act. Its impact may be summarised as giving the
Parliament the right of veto where a committee has given
a positive opinion, and certain powers to influence the final
outcome where a committee has not. Following a set of
urgent cases to which the new procedure was applied in
2007, a massive process of “general alignment” was under
way by early 2008.
Against this background, the Lisbon Treaty foresees a
future division of all acts adopted on the basis of secondary
legislation into two categories. Delegated acts (to be
termed “delegated regulations” etc.) will be “non-legislative
acts of general application to supplement or amend certain
non-essential elements of the legislative act”. They will be
adopted by the Commission on the basis of powers delegated
to it by the legislator in the legislative act, subject to
supervision and possible revocation of the delegation by
either the Parliament or the Council. Implementing acts (to
be termed “implementing regulation” etc.) will be adopted
“[w]here uniform conditions for implementing legally binding
Union acts are needed” on the basis of implementing
powers conferred in such acts on the Commission or, in
some cases, the Council. The Council and the Parliament
will, by codecision, adopt “the rules and general principles
concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of
the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers”.
It seems probable that the concept of delegated acts will
cover the same areas now being placed under the regulatory
procedure with scrutiny plus all those of similar nature
arising in the new areas to which the ordinary legislative
procedure will be applied. However the modalities for
implementation of this concept will have to be defined.
What kind of body will carry out the task of reviewing the
Commission’s work on behalf of the Council? Implementing
acts will presumably be considered to be those now being
left under the advisory, management and regulatory
procedures, but it remains to be clarified whether the same
procedures will be retained, and with what rights for the
Parliament. A successor to the current comitology decision
will have to be agreed, which will, in contrast to last time,
be done by codecision between Council and Parliament.
Majority voting Majority voting Majority voting Majority voting Majority voting
The new Treaty provides for a significant extension of
qualified-majority voting (which also becomes the “default
setting” of the Treaty). A new system of majority voting is
also foreseen to replace the Nice arrangements, with a
threshold for a qualified-majority requiring 55% of Member
States and 65% of total population, with a minimum of four
countries required for a blocking minority. This new system
would in principle make decision-making in the Council
more efficient (although one should not exaggerate the
importance in day-to-day reality of the details of the voting
system; the basic question is simply whether or not a
majority vote is possible). However, it will not come into
effect at all until 1 November 2014, and even then, until 31
March 2017 a Member State may request that the Nice
system is applied in particular cases. In other words, in the
medium term there will be no change in this respect.
National parliaments National parliaments National parliaments National parliaments National parliaments
A new Article 12 in the TFEU lists the ways in which national
parliaments “contribute actively to the good functioning of
the Union”. These include the role of “seeing to it” that theEIPASCOPE 2008/1
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principle of subsidiarity is respected in decision-making.
This is developed in detail in the Protocol on the Role of
National Parliaments in the European Union, and the
modified Protocol on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
National parliaments are to receive directly all “draft
legislative acts” (i.e. proposals from the Commission,
initiatives from a group of Member States, initiatives from
the European Parliament, requests from the Court of
Justice, recommendations from the European Central Bank
and requests from the European Investment Bank for the
adoption of a legislative act)
as well as amended drafts,
legislative resolutions of the
European Parliament and
positions of the Council.
Each national parliament
will have two votes, which
may be shared between
chambers in the case of
bicameral parliaments.
Within eight weeks of receipt
of the draft acts (in all the
official languages) they may
issue reasoned opinions on a draft act’s non-compliance
with the principle of subsidiarity. If such opinions represent
one-third of the votes (one-quarter in the case of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters), the draft will have
to be “reviewed” by its author. In the case of proposals
under the ordinary legislative procedure, if such opinions
represent a simple majority of the votes, the draft will have
to be reviewed. If the Commission maintains its proposal it
will have to issue a reasoned opinion stating why the
proposal is justified in terms of subsidiarity. Either the
Council or the Parliament may then decide to terminate the
legislative procedure.
These two general provisions have been dubbed,
following the sporting practice, “yellow” and “orange”
cards. There is in fact also one, rarely-commented, provision
which is equivalent to a “red card” which can be used by any
single national parliament, namely decisions determining
those aspects of family law with cross-border implications
which may be the subject of acts adopted by the ordinary
legislative procedure.9
It remains to be seen what practical impact these
provisions will actually have. Eight weeks is not a long time
for a parliament to act. In all events, however, they may
help to increase the quantity and quality of national
debates over European initiatives involving opposition
parties and civil society, a need which is more important
and relevant than to allow national governments to be
stopped by the parliamentary majorities on which they in
most cases rest.
Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks
What can one say at this stage with respect to the likely
consequences of all this for the efficiency, quality and
transparency of EU decision-making, and for the overall
legitimacy of the EU system?
It obviously remains to be seen what will happen in
practice, but the new provisions do not in themselves
promise any major change in the efficiency of decision-
making. On the one hand, the Treaty comes on top of the
procedural adaptations which have already been introduced
to deal with enlargement as well as an important reform to
the system of comitology. On the other hand, it is not self-
evident that the additional treaty changes will lead to
greater efficiency. Despite majority voting (and, as noted
above, the treaty changes will not actually come into effect
for a long time), codecision does not mean quicker
procedures or simpler laws. This is all the more so in the
enlarged Union; evidence from recent years indicates that
codecision procedures have been taking longer than before,
and that the texts adopted are longer (Best and Settembri
2008). It can also be expected that the new arrangements
which will be implemented
to replace the current comi-
tology system will not make
decision-making any quick-
er. At the time of writing, the
practical implications of the
2006 reform remain unclear
(Christiansen and Vaccari
2006). Comitology decisions
under the new regulatory
procedure with scrutiny only
began to be adopted in
2008. We have no experi-
ence of how Parliament will “play” the arrangements, nor
of the impact of the new language conditions: the periods
for Parliamentary action will henceforth only start to operate
once the measure has been transmitted in all official
languages, while it is also possible that there may be
pressures to implement a new language regime in
comitology committees (Alfé et al 2008).
It is also unclear what all this will mean for the quality of
decisions. In addition to questions as to how the Parliament
will manage to process the great mass of measures involv-
ed – and the extension of codecision to agriculture and
other areas will entail a further leap in the demands on
Parliament – there is also some concern as to the content
of Parliament’s input. The Parliament has very few “technical”
resources of its own to support the positions of its Members.
The risk is already present that Parliament’s positions may
rely on the kind offer of expertise from interested parties.
What can be done to prevent this from having even wider
consequences? In addition, the kinds of procedural devices
which have been adopted in order to facilitate decision-
making under the codecision procedure – notably the
practice of reaching agreements at first reading on the
basis of informal negotiations between the institutions –
continue to raise some questions as to their consequences
for the transparency and quality of parliamentary practice.
Will the Treaty at least make decision-making more
transparent – notably easier for people to understand? The
answer is probably “yes” on balance, so long as they only
look at the consolidated versions and concentrate on the
main issues rather than all the details. Even if the
terminological distinction is not as great as hoped, the new
system does provide for a formal hierarchy of acts. The
differentiation between the categories of non-legislative
acts is also a positive step in principle with regard to the
clarification of powers. Yet the new system in fact increases
the number of basic procedures involved even when it
comes to acts adopted on the basis of secondary legislation.
In addition, there are numerous non-legislative acts which
are adopted directly on the basis of the Treaties. Looking
only at the main variables (Council decision-making rule,
power of the EP, source of the proposal/role of the
Will the Treaty at least
make decision-making
easier for people to
understand? The answer is
probably “yes” on balance.www.eipa.eu
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Commission) there are 19 different procedures of this
nature. Together with four variants of the ordinary legislative
procedure and seven kinds of special legislative procedure,
one can therefore identify as many as 30 different
procedures by which binding acts can be adopted on the
basis of the TFEU, quite apart from the specific procedures
applicable to CFSP/CSDP under the TEU (Best 2008).
In terms of legitimacy and public support, finally, the
Treaty is likely to have a limited impact. Hopes that the
reform process might itself help achieve political consensus
and public consent have been subordinated to efforts to
ensure ratification with as little debate as possible. Moreover,
while the further strengthening of the powers of the European
Parliament may rightly be held to increase the formal
democratic quality of the Union, the fact remains that
greater formal powers for the EP do not in themselves
translate automatically or universally into greater popular
acceptance of the EU system. It remains to be seen whether
people will be reassured by the kind of role foreseen for
national parliaments in controlling subsidiarity, or whether
at least some will rather be confirmed in their scepticism by
the negative imagery of national parliaments’ having to
save people from some of the mad or bad things that might
otherwise come at them from Brussels.
Although it is indeed unlikely that further developments
will take the form of major treaty reform in the near future,
this is not the end of the road in the evolution of EU
decision-making. Some important steps still have formally
to be taken to define how things will work, most notably
concerning the future of comitology, and the new structures
and procedures in CFSP. In the coming years, at least some
of the complications and exceptions introduced as a result
of the recent political negotiations may be reviewed.
Beyond this, there is no reason to believe that the dynamics
of institutional change will cease to operate: the new
provisions do not guarantee complete political consensus
or perfect practical performance; the institutional actors in
European integration will not stop pursuing their interests;
and the evolution of the EU’s decision-making procedures
will inevitably be influenced by, perhaps even more than
they influence, the broader challenges of consolidating a
stable system of multi-level European governance.
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NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
* Dr Edward Best, Professor, Head of Unit “European Decision-
Making”, EIPA.
1 The author would like to thank Michael Kaeding and Pierpaolo
Settembri for helpful comments received.
2 Presidency conclusions, Brussels, 14 December 2007, 16616/
07.
3 The Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel
Community (1951, entering into force in 1952). The two
Treaties of Rome (1957, entering into force in 1958) established
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (known as “Euratom”). These three
were for most purposes merged as the “European
Communities”, but there were significant differences in powers
and procedures. The current system of European law-making
is primarily derived from the EEC model.
4 Simple majority has been the “default setting” of the Treaty but
applies to very few cases and not to the adoption of legislative
acts.
5 Recommendations and Opinions are also retained as non-
binding instruments.
6 Ex Art. 249 TEC, renumbered Art. 288 TFEU, fourth indent.
7 There are also minor exceptions giving the initiative to the
European Central Bank and the Court of Justice in specific
cases concerning those institutions’ statutes.
8 The 1999 decision also foresaw a so-called safeguard
procedure. This, however, provides for an appeal to the
Council by an affected Member State, and not a committee
procedure.
9 Article 81(3) TFEU.